Quick, grab your gas mask!

I have never been a big fan of the Bush Administration. I despised the decision to hastily enter Iraq, and I still maintain that view. The administration’s national security obsession made hearing those words trigger my gag reflex. Therefore, it surprises me to find some recent government action acceptable. Recent attempts to stop building biodefense laboratories trigger a debate about protecting the country from biological attacks. The United States currently lacks the technology to prevent or handle a large-scale biological attack. With no arms buildup to threaten world peace, biodefense research can upgrade the United States’ defense capabilities.

However, not everyone shares the same views towards biodefense. A recent editorial in Nature proposed a different opinion towards biodefense research. “Enough Biodefence,” first appeared on November 2, 2006. The editorial board at Nature challenges building biodefense laboratories for the sake of natural interest. The article cites several examples of biodefense laboratories being constructed in the United States. Local residents have protested and legally challenged the biodefense labs’ constructions near their homes. The article does not take a stance on these issues, but does being to ponder the underlying issue. The writer states, “The proliferation of such labs begs the broader question of how much biodefense is too much.” Biodefense’s importance became more evident following the anthrax-infested mail circulating after September 11, 2001. The threat of biological warfare was never more threatening. The United States feared terrorists would use similar agents to wreak havoc on society. It wouldn’t be the first time that happened in the world. In 1995, a Japanese terrorist group known as Aum Shinrikyo (now known as Aleph) carried out a nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system. The attack killed 12 people and injured thousands. The threat of similar attacks caused the United States to increase it’s biodefense research funding ($36 billion total).

Nature argues that the public needs to know the importance of biodefense. They believe the administration got a free pass back in 2001 when the government originally implemented biodefense research. The political climate at the time was much less speculative on government decisions, assuming that all were made to solely protect the country. Five years later, Nature asks the White House to explain how the proliferation of biodefense knowledge pertains to national interest. In short, if you build the biodefense labs, for what reason are you building them?

They have a valid point. Is there some threat of which the public is unaware? The government wouldn’t spend $178 million for a biodefense laboratory at the Boston University Medical Center unless they needed it, would they? But what Nature ignores is the importance of analyzing current and future bioterrorism and biological warfare threats. Bioterrorism could very well be improbable science fiction today, but it could be a reality in the near future.

Bioterrorism is not as passive as someone releasing a rhinovirus (common cold) into a populated area. Government agencies worry about more potent viruses and diseases that often cause death quickly. The American Medical Association (AMA) lists inhalational anthrax as a potential bioterrorism threat. Inhalational anthrax (more serious than cutaneous anthrax that circulated in the mail in 2001) results from inhaling anthrax bacterial spores. Upon inhalation, the spores release toxins into the respiratory system. Inhalational anthrax symptoms are similar to influenza, but often the infected subjects die within two or three days of showing symptoms. Vaccines against anthrax do exist, but are not readily available to the public. Military personnel and other at-risk individuals can receive the shot, but the AMA reports that it requires six shots over an eighteen-month period, plus yearly booster shots. Biodefense research can discover more effective vaccines and preventative measures, to deter a large-scale bioterrorist attack.

Airborne anthrax outbreaks are not fictitious or theoretical. “Anthrax as a Biological Weapon,” by Thomas V. Inglesby, Donald A. Henderson, John G. Barlett, Michael S. Ascher, et al., appeared in the May 12, 1999 issue of The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA). The article reports that a Soviet “military microbiology” facility’s accidental release of airborne anthrax spores caused 68 deaths from 79 reported infections (1736). Aum Shinrikyo, the Tokyo sarin gas attack perpetrators, attempted to release airborne anthrax in Tokyo at least eight times, but did not cause any infections. The reasons the attack failed are unknown. Additional problems exist since an airborne outbreak of anthrax is invisible and odorless. Tracking an inhalational anthrax outbreak would be nearly impossible given current technology. Biodefense research could create the proper technology to trace potential outbreaks.

Doctors and health professionals need additional knowledge to diagnose anthrax infections. Inglesby et al. write, “early diagnosis of inhilational anthrax would be difficult and require a high index of suspicion,” (1737). Only 18 cases have occurred in the United States in the past 100 years, and clinical reports from the Soviet Union outbreak are vague (thank you, Stalin). Early diagnosis of dangerous diseases will improve the United States’ biological warfare and bioterrorism defenses

Thanks to the Freedom of Information Act, government documents are easily available to the public (that is, unless they are classified). The Congressional Research Service (CRS) report outlining the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) provides support for the “proliferation of knowledge” regarding biodefense that Nature challenged. The CRS report claims that the NBACC would “assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences” of biological threats. In addition, the research center could conduct “forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism” in case of an attack.

International agreements, like the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, demand that the United States restrains from developing biological weapons. Because of this, the NBACC would require significant oversight, both domestic and international. I wrote about a previous Nature editorial, “Enough Warheads, Already,” that protested replacing the United State’s nuclear stockpile with modern warheads. I agreed with the editor’s stance. However, defending ourselves from biological warfare is much more noble, and provides very little threat to world peace. In contrast to the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, the NBACC would not create and stockpile weapons.

The editors from Nature may still have concern over classified research that the CRS report outlines will occur at the NBACC. Classified research is necessary to protect our interests. Providing a full disclosure of research from the laboratory would explicitly state where our interests are focused. In turn, this would give opportunists a chance to take advantage of our weaknesses. Once strategies for defending against a certain biological agent are finalized, the information can be declassified, as it is likely that agent would be rendered obsolete. What good is a biological agent that poses no threat to the citizens of the United States?

The fact that biodefense laboratories are being built close to residential settlements is an important debate. While it makes sense to build biodefense laboratories away from heavily populated areas as a precaution, there is nothing else that should obstruct the research they perform. We do not need three or four biodefense laboratories in every state, but around a half-dozen biodefense laboratories nationwide will be sufficient. It is unknown whether or not biological warfare will ever occur. To ensure such warfare is ineffective against the United States, the government is researching current vulnerabilities to create strong countermeasures.

The editors at Nature wondered how the “proliferation of knowledge” pertained to national interest. As you can see, biodefense research is essential to guaranteeing the United States’ future safety and security.



1. “Enough Biodefense.” Nature 444 (2006): 2.
2. Inglesby, Thomas V. et al. "Anthrax as a Biological Weapon." The Journal of the American Medical Association 281 (1999): 1735-1745.